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1.	Introduction
Margaret Gilbert, the grand old lady of social ontology, has turned to rights theory in this impressive book. However, the back-cover blurb of the book is bound to cause bafflement among those familiar with the literature covering rights. The book claims to be the ‘first extended treatment of demand-rights’. A demand-right is then identified as ‘the standing or authority to demand a particular action from another person’. In the Preface, Gilbert further states that this class of rights ‘has not received extended attention from rights theorists. In some cases, it is barely noticed’ (vi). Thought Gilbert’s treatment is in many ways novel, the just-mentioned claim is surprising: demand-rights sound very similar to how rights are understood in the so-called will theories of rights. At times, Gilbert explicitly recognizes the affinities of will-theory rights and demand-rights (e.g. at 244, where she takes H.L.A. Hart’s early conception of a right to be ‘extremely close, if not identical, to that of a demand-right’). Will theories have certainly been subject to numerous treatments, some of which can justifiably be described as ‘extensive’. How demand-rights relate to will-theory rights is one issue I will return to below.
The overall structure of the book is the following. Part I focuses on rights theories, including the debate between the will and interest theories of rights, as well as the analysis of rights originally presented by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1913). Here Gilbert challenges many of the central tenets of the rights-theory literature, such as the assumption that there are two domains of rights: moral and legal. Gilbert introduces the notion of demand-rights, understanding them as the counterparts of directed duties (duties held toward someone or something). Gilbert thus essentially takes demand-rights to be what rights theorists often label ‘claims’. She is, however, careful not to assert that claims or demand-rights would be ‘the primary or paradigmatic rights’ (77), even though ‘one might reasonably think they are’ (77). Thus, she does not claim to be offering an overall theory of rights, but just a treatment of demand-rights – which she thinks ‘have some title be thought of as rights par excellence’ (v). 
Part I is also where Gilbert for the first time presents the demand-right problem: how can X have the standing to demand with authority some type of conduct from Y? This issue of standing to demand is central for her account. She first seeks the answer to the demand-right problem from rights-theory literature, but is left dissatisfied.
In Part II, Gilbert turns to the vast Anglophone literature on promises and agreements to explain the demand-right problem. Much of the discussion is focused on moral-principle accounts, which employ moral principles to explain duties ensuing from promises or agreements. Gilbert is sceptical of such accounts. One criticism is what she terms the inevitability problem: ‘the promisor’s obligation is an inevitable consequence of any promise that is still in force’ (135, emphasis in original). Shortly put, Gilbert takes even promises to perform heinous deeds to result in obligations: if X promises Y to murder Z, Y has the authority to demand that X perform the deed even if it is clearly morally wrong.
Part II also contains a solution to the demand-right problem. Unsurprisingly, the key is to be found in joint commitment, a central notion of Gilbert’s social ontology. Gilbert argues that X’s standing to demand actions or omissions from Y results from X and Y’s having jointly committed to endorsing as a body a particular plan of action. From this understanding of demand-rights flows what might be one of the most contentious theses of the book: the ‘demand-rights proper’ that result from joint commitment are neither moral nor legal. There is thus a third realm of rights. I will return below to the question of how contentious or novel this claim indeed is.
Part III is a treatment of demand-rights in the context of morality, law and human rights. Gilbert is highly critical of the notion that moral demand-rights could exist without joint commitment, even if she does not completely rule out that possibility. She argues, for instance, against the notion that even the demand-right not to be assaulted could be grounded in morality alone, i.e. that it could be established by moral argumentation alone. The claim is not as outlandish as it may seem, as I will note below.
After addressing the possibility of moral demand-rights, Gilbert then forays into general jurisprudence (theorizing about the nature of law). She argues that law can only generate demand-rights proper if the population of a legal system are jointly committed to uphold as a body that legal system – or rather its rule of recognition, which the officials of that system use to determine the norms of the system. The final substantive chapter is devoted to human rights. Gilbert argues, again not very surprisingly, that demand-rights can only flow from human rights if a relevant kind of joint commitment to respect those human rights exists.
Overall, Gilbert’s treatment of the issues at hand is highly sophisticated and careful. I will now first address some issues pertaining to the form of demand rights; then discuss Gilbert’s view that demand-rights are grounded in joint commitment rather than law or morality; and finally make some remarks on her view of law. In the Conclusion, I will briefly discuss some of the implications that her view has for moral philosophy.
2.	The form of demand-rights
The book offers a well-informed discussion of many of the foundational questions of rights theory, while making significant contributions to it.
Those who have contributed to the ‘debate over rights’ can be classified into two camps – the will theorists and the interest theorists – as well as some outliers. Roughly put, will (or choice) theories generally take rights to protect the autonomy of rational agents; they often define ‘a right’ in terms of the control that an agent has over the duties of others. Interest (or benefit) theories, on the other hand, take rights to protect interests and often identify a right-holder as some X whose interests either justify the imposition of a duty upon some Y, or whose interests are typically served by the duty of Y. (For an assessment of the ‘state of the art’ of the debate over rights, see Frydrych, 2018.)
As mentioned above, Gilbert on the one hand takes her account to be very similar to certain accounts of rights but, on the other hand, stresses the uniqueness of her account. Is her theory of demand-rights a will theory? We should first note that Gilbert is what might be termed a rights pluralist – or at least she is not a rights monist: she does not claim that demand-rights are the only type of rights, even if demand-rights ‘have some title be thought of as rights par excellence’ (v). Rights pluralism is not atypical of will theorists. For instance, even though Hart took rights to consist primarily in the empowerment to control others’ duties, he suggested that some constitutional rights can be understood as immunities from adverse legal change (Hart 1982, 189–192). Gilbert, on the other hand, does not have much to say about what other rights there are apart from demand-rights. She does not claim that her theory would cover the ‘canonical ascriptions’ (81) of rights nor does she assess other theories for their success in accounting for such ascriptions.
Let us now look more carefully at what exactly Gilbert means by demand-rights. As already mentioned, demand-rights have to do with the standing to demand a certain action or omission of someone. This standing has to do with one’s authority to demand. (In its focus on authority, Gilbert’s account bears some resemblance to the recent ‘modal theory’ of rights articulated in Nieswandt 2019).
Gilbert rightfully distinguishes X’s standing to demand with authority that Y phi from X’s being justified in doing so. Thus, demanding without the appropriate standing may result in responses such as ‘“Who are you to demand that of me?” and “You’re not in a position to demand that of me!”’ (58). On the other hand, an unjustified act of demanding something that one has the authority to demand may, for instance, be met with a combination of resentment and compliance. Demand-rights have thus primarily to do with powers rather than liberties – with being empowered rather than permitted. 
What kind of a status does a demand-right endow with its holder? At a number of junctures, Gilbert compares and contrasts demand-rights with Hartian will-theory rights (64–70; 175–179). These two notions of rights are in many ways alike. Both have to do with the direction of duties, or with the owing of an action or omission to the right-holder. Both associate right-holding with being empowered to demand the fulfilment of the correlative duty and to waive it. Furthermore, according to both authors, a right-holder is wronged by a contravention of the correlative obligation. The accounts are, regardless, not identical. For instance, Gilbert does not think that demand-rights can be waived unilaterally: barring special cases, the duty-bearer must agree to the waiving (178). However, in spite of these differences – and even though Gilbert somewhat distances herself from the will/interest theory debate – the theory of demand-rights is certainly classifiable as a will theory of rights. As such, Gilbert’s account raises similar questions as do many other will theories. 
One question pertains to the status of those not capable of being jointly committed, such as infants and animals. Others can certainly jointly commit to, say, protect infants from various types of harm, but is it the case that the infant receives no demand-rights as a result? Note that, in legal contexts, infants can be represented: if X harms infant Y in a way that constitutes tort, the infant’s representative Y may sue the tortfeasor for damages in Y’s name. Many jurists would be inclined to ascribe to the infant some kind of a legal demand-right. Gilbert would likely agree to this ascription, given her voluntarist view of law. She claims that law ‘can say pretty much whatever it wants, by way of stipulation’ (53) – a view that many a legal philosopher will find frustrating. Though legislation may certainly contain whatever the legislator chooses to include in it, this does not mean that if the legislator chooses to endow mathematical entities with rights, mathematical entities would thereby gain rights. At any rate – putting aside legal demand-rights – could an infant ever hold a demand-right proper? 
One might initially think that Gilbert’s rights pluralism – her allowance that demand-rights might not be the only types of rights – would allow her to deflect much of the criticism that has been directed at will theories regarding the rights of infants, mentally incapacitated people and nonhuman animals. Thus, Gilbert could simply say that infants cannot hold demand-rights but that nothing in her account excludes them from holding other types of rights. However, Gilbert does present her account of demand-rights as an account of directed duties, i.e. of duties borne toward (or conduct owed to) someone or something (70–71). Thus, if children cannot hold demand-rights, then duties cannot be borne toward them and actions not owed to them. There may be duties pertaining to children, mentally incapacitated people and animals, but not toward them. Further, though Gilbert does not explicitly commit to the notion of demand-rights’ being primary rights, or rights par excellence, she does occasionally come very close:
Insofar as claims are understood as demand-rights, and it is only demand-rights, as such, that allow a supposed right-holder to assert his right, then one might argue that claims are primary for this reason. What kind of right is it, one might ask, that cannot be asserted? (76)
Thus – though the last sentence just quoted emphasizes the connection between rights and assertability, rather than assertability by the right-holder – demand-rights do seem primary, and infants do not seem to be able to hold such rights. Whether demand-rights can be exercised on behalf of infants or nonhuman animals would have warranted further consideration, though Gilbert does occasionally broach the topic (e.g. at 323).
3.	Demand-rights and joint commitment
Gilbert’s account of the form of demand-rights is interesting and significant in its own right. However, the likely most central contribution of the book has to do with the ground of demand-rights: How can demand-rights be possible? In other words, how can one have the standing to demand actions of others? This question is of course particularly relevant for will theorists, but it is not uninteresting for interest theorists either: even if the standing to demand the fulfilment of rights were not a necessary component of rights, it is certainly an important feature of many rights. Gilbert is correct in noting that the specific question of how one can be in a position to demand some action of others has not been at the focus of very many rights theorists. After going through some of the potential accounts, Gilbert remarks rightly:
[W]ith respect to what we find in Thomson, Raz, and interest theories generally, the conditions on rights—or more specifically claims—offered or suggested do not suffice for the right-holder to have the standing to demand the object of the right. With respect to Hart’s choice theory, in a non-legal version, either it presupposes this standing, or, once again, its conditions do not suffice to provide it. (97–98)
She then goes on to argue that the ground of demand-rights can only be found in joint commitment. The view that there are obligations or reasons-for-action not grounded in either law or morality is of course not a new idea, as many have presented accounts of such obligations or reasons, flowing from rationality. On the other hand, the claim that moral and legal rights are not the only types of rights is not particularly contentious either, insofar as legal rights are understood as normatively inert – which is in line with the thinking of many legal positivists. If legal rights can legitimately be called ‘rights’ notwithstanding their incapacity to provide any reasons-for-action, then there might be rights flowing from any type of practice. The novelty of Gilbert’s view comes from the connection she posits between commitment-based obligations and rights, and the claim that such rights are genuinely normative.
What renders the account contentious is Gilbert’s scepticism toward the notion that anything apart from joint commitment could ground demand-rights proper. Thus, she even claims that one cannot hold the demand-right not to be assaulted unless such a right flows from a joint commitment. However, this claim is not as radical as it may first seem. First, Gilbert only denies that such demand-rights, i.e. correlatives of directed duties, could exist. She does not deny that one regardless could have the non-directed obligation not to assault others; this would simply not be a directed obligation according to Gilbert. Furthermore, she holds that mere ‘mutual recognition’ can ground demand-rights. According to Gilbert, ‘two or more people mutually recognize one another, in my sense, if each of them is currently present in a given place and they jointly commit themselves to recognize as a body that fact’ (227). Gilbert connects mutual recognition ‘with behavior that is at least minimally caring, concerned and respectful of the parties concerned, including abstention from assault. … [M]utual recognition, as constituted by the pertinent joint commitment, gives us demand-rights to the kind of behavior that morality is often deemed, crucially, to require of us’ (260). It is, of course, somewhat unsettling that Gilbert thinks such directed obligations do not ensue for X vis-à-vis Y if X does not recognize Y. Does slaver X acquire no duties toward Y (correlated by Y’s demand-rights), if X only treats Y as prey, to be captured and sold? Gilbert does not address the question whether there is a moral obligation for such recognition. Such obligations could function as the moral basis for many demand-rights. They would also provide an explanation for the intuition to want to ascribe demand-rights and directed duties in cases where mutual recognition is lacking: there would thus be a moral requirement to engage in mutual recognition.
Inevitability point
As mentioned above, Gilbert argues for what she labels the inevitability point: ‘Every promise obligates the promisor irrespective of any considerations other than that he made the promise’ (135). This point functions as an argument against accounts that ground promissory obligations in morality. She then presents a number of examples to illustrate and defend her view, such as the following: 
Alan promises his friend Bea that he will come to her house for dinner that evening. On the way to Bea’s house Alan comes across an accident victim whose life he could save—provided he skip his appointment with Bea. Assuming that these are the only pertinent facts, Alan is surely not morally required to act as promised, though his promise is still in force. Indeed, he is morally required not to act as promised. (136)
Even though Alan is morally required not to act as promised, Bea does not lose her demand-right:
One can then ask: did Bea lose the standing to demand the promised act the moment that Alan was no longer morally required to perform the promise? Surely she was in a position to demand Alan’s performance of the promise as long as it was in force, irrespective of Alan’s moral position. Of course once a promisee knows of the new considerations he may not be justified in demanding performance but, it seems, he will still have the standing to do so, by virtue of his promise. The same goes for his standing to rebuke the promisor for nonperformance.
Thus Bea might say later: “I’m not going to rebuke you for failing to show up, given what happened, but I wish you’d called to let me know you weren’t coming.” Here she implies that were she inclined to rebuke him, in these circumstances, she has the needed standing. (137)
Once the justification for demanding performance and the standing to do so are distinguished, the argument is plausible. However, one wonders if the standing to rebuke does persist in cases where it is practically impossible to keep one’s promise, e.g. if Alan is captured as a hostage by a group of terrorists, or run over by a car, thereby falling unconscious for days. It would not only be unjustified but rather outright bizarre if, after his release from captivity or the hospital, Bea rebuked him for not showing up. Or rather, it is quite unclear what a rebuke could even amount to in such circumstances.
4.	On law
The penultimate substantive chapter of the book addresses questions relating to the connection of law and demand-rights.
By far the most influential modern account of law is Hart’s analysis of law as a union of primary and secondary rules (or primary and secondary norms, as some later authors prefer to call them – see Kramer 2018). Primary rules regulate the conduct of those subject to the norms of the legal system, whereas secondary rules pertain to the primary rules, laying down how they are to be applied, interpreted and changed. A particularly important secondary rule is the rule of recognition, a social rule followed by the officials of the legal system to ascertain and determine the content of the legal system.
A central question in general jurisprudence is whether law is normative in the robust sense, viz. providing its subjects with reasons for action. (Law is of course normative in the weak sense, viz. having to do with norms.) Most scholars writing in the legal positivist tradition do not take law to be robustly normative. There may of course be reasons – moral, prudential or others – to obey the law, or at least some norms of some legal systems, but it is not a necessary feature of legal obligations that there is a reason to follow them.
Gilbert starts by distinguishing two conceptions of law, the abstract conception and the concrete conception. She writes:
The abstract conception sees law as an abstract object which is, in and of itself, normatively inert. It is, centrally, a system of rules in a broad sense.
The practical toothlessness of law on the abstract conception may have led to the prominence of the concrete conception in the philosophy of law. On this conception, law is a matter of the “existence” or, sometimes, “actual existence” of a legal system, where, to put it very broadly, a legal system exists, in the relevant sense, only when it is instantiated in the lives of a number of human beings in a particular way. (295)
Gilbert’s phrasing here is misleading. When contrasting the abstract conception with the practical conception, and defining the latter conception in terms of existence, she seems to suggest that scholars who take legal systems to be normatively inert would thereby consider the existence of a legal system to be immaterial in some way. Thus, Roman law and Italian law would make equally little difference to the lives of people living in modern-day Italy. Legal philosophers who deny law’s normativity do of course think that Roman law and Italian law are on a par in that neither necessarily gives anyone any reason to obey their maxims. However, only existing legal systems can guide conduct through the setting of general standards of behaviour. It is through these standards, and their accompanying enforcement mechanisms, that legal systems are ‘instantiated in the lives’ of the population. Any ultimate reason to obey these standards stems, however, from outside of the law.
The just-presented squabbles notwithstanding, what Gilbert sets out do is a worthy task. She wants to provide a definition of a legal system that would always supply the population with reasons for following the norms of the legal system, as well as with demand-rights that others follow those norms. She asks: ‘given that I fall into a category of persons having a particular right according to some legal system, when does anyone have reason to respect that right?’ (299). She then proceeds to ask two more specific questions regarding the relationship of law and demand-rights. The first one she labels the population question:
Supposing that a legal system exists in a population, P, do the members of P have, by virtue of this, special demand-rights against one another to their compliance with the rules of the system? (300)
The second the demand-right-holder question:
Suppose that X, a member of population P, falls into a category of persons, C1, each of whom, according to legal system LS, has a demand-right against any member of P in category C2 to his phi-ing. Is there a plausible understanding of the existence of LS in P, such that, by virtue of this, X has an actual demand-right against each member of P in category C2 to his phi-ing? (300)
Both are interesting particular versions of the more general problem of the normativity of law. After considering numerous candidate accounts of law, she proposes that the two questions just raised are best answered by the joint-commitment account of law:
Legal system LS with rule of recognition R exists in population P if and only if members of P are jointly committed to uphold R as a body. (318)
The definition is certainly interesting and persuasive as an account of how law could be imbued with joint-commitment normativity. In its application of social ontology to legal philosophy, the account bears some resemblance to, for instance, Scott Shapiro’s planning theory of law (2011). Its particular strength is that it can account for the content-independent exclusionary impact that legal norms claim to have, as has been argued most famously by Joseph Raz (1979, ch 2). This claim to authority, as characterized by Gilbert, is ‘that irrespective of [the content of the legal norms] their addressees have sufficient reason to conform to them […] and that there are at least some factors that will not count against their being conformed to: consideration of these factors is excluded from the start’ (303, emphasis in original). Given that joint-commitment obligations according to Gilbert are also content-independent and exclusionary, her account is a highly promising explanation of how legal systems can generate reasons for action for committed subjects. Of course, the ultimate source of these reasons is joint commitment rather than law.
It is somewhat unclear whether Gilbert also thinks that law according to ‘the abstract conception’ is constituted by joint commitment. At any rate, the joint-commitment account of law is implausible as such an account of law: a legal system can certainly exist in a population even if a significant part of the population were not committed to upholding the rule of recognition. Rather, as Hart famously argued, the rule of recognition is a social rule shared by the officials of the legal system, whereas the general populace only needs to conform to the duties imposed of the legal system. (However, see Gilbert’s interesting discussion of conformity at 306.) Whether officials’ – rather than the population’s – joint commitment to uphold the rule of recognition could explain law according to the abstract conception is a question Gilbert does not address.
5.	Conclusion
Gilbert makes a powerful and persuasive argument. If correct, it also has some highly interesting implications for moral philosophy. I will conclude by highlighting two such implications.
First, the account provides many utilitarians and other consequentalists with a tool for explaining the normative force of promising and other agreements. Though consequentalism is able to account for the beneficial consequences of why promises generally should be kept, it often struggles to explain why some X should fulfil her promises unless this token of promise-fulfilment also has the best possible consequences. Gilbert’s account provides a solution: Promises always have a normative force, and ought therefore always to be kept. However, the ‘ought’ here is not moral, but rather flows from joint commitment. Promises may of course also obligate morally, but that is a separate matter.
Yet another subject that Gilbert’s account may influence is something she herself discusses, namely, moral dilemmas. Gilbert herself thinks that moral requirements cannot conflict (40–41). However, many philosophers (e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong 1988) have argued that genuine moral dilemmas exist, where some X, all things considered, ought to both phi and not phi, or ought to phi-1 and phi-2, where it is practically impossible to both phi-1 and phi-2. However, a central example employed in the moral-dilemmas literature is obligations resulting from promises or agreements. Again, if such obligations are in fact primarily commitment-based rather than moral, perhaps moral dilemmas are not as prevalent as some like to think.
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